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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider several types of in­
formation and methods of combination asso­
ciated with incomplete probabilistic systems. 
\Ve discriminate between 'a priori' and evi­
dential information. The former one is a de­
scription of the whole population, the latest 
is a restriction based on observations for a 
particular case. Then, we proposse different 
combination methods for each one of them. 
'We also consider conditioning as the hetero­
geneous combination of 'a priori' and eviden­
tial information. The evidential information is 
represented as a convex set of likelihood func­
tions. These will have an associated possi­
bility distribution with behavior according to 
classical Possibility Theory. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Probability Theory the main method of incorpo­
rating new information is through conditioning. In 
general, there is no doubt about how to represent ini­
tial information and how to update it in the light of 
new observations. However, when we work with pro­
babilistic intervals, there is a bit of a mess. Several 
formulas of combining and conditioning are available, 
the main problem being which formula or method to 
use in a particular case. The reason for this is the lack 
of a firm semantic basis. 
In this paper we present a method of tackling incom­
plete probabilistic information, which tries to avoid 
this kind of ambiguity. The main feature is the clear 
distinction between evidential and 'a priori' informa­
tion. Evidential information will be represented as a 
convex set of likelihood functions with an associated 
possibility distribution. The interpretation of these 
possibilities will have a probabilistic basis. However 
their behavior will be very similar to classical possibil­
ity distributions (Dubois, Prade 1988; Zadeh 1978). 
We shall discriminate between the combination of ev­
idential information and the combination of 'a priori' 
information. Conditioning will be a kind of heteroge­
neous combination: 'a priori' and evidential informa­
tion. The result is called 'a posteriori' information. 
This 'a posteriori' information is different from that 
resulting from applying known formulas of calculat­
ing conditional information: Dempster conditioning 
(Dempster 1967) and upper and lower conditioning 
(Dempster 1967; Campos, Lamata, llforal 1990; Fa­
gin, Halpern 1990). 
The problem of applying Dempster-Shafer Theory of 
Evidence (Dempster 1967; Shafer 1976) to upper and 
lower probabilities is that there is only one way of com­
bining information, the so called Dempster rule of com­
bination. Furthermore, the most used conditioning is 
Dempster conditioning (Dempster 1967; Moral, Cam­
pos 1990) which is a particular case of Dempster rule. 
So all information is combined in an homogeneous way. 
This gives rise to cases in which Dempster rule seems 
rea�onable and cases in which the results are not very 
intuitive. In general, Dempster conditioning produces 
very narrow intervals, if upper and lower probabilities 
interpretation is considered (Pearl 1989). 
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2 'A PRIORI' INFORMATION 
Let X be a variable taking values on a finite set U = 
{ u1, ... , Um}. An 'a priori' information about X is a 
convex set of probabilities, 
where { P1, P2, ... P,} is a finite set of probabilities on 
U. In general, this information is applicable under a 
determined set of conditions Co under which X takes 
its values. The meaning is that one element of 1i. is the 
true probability distribution associated with X, under 
conditions Co. Given a set of possible probabilities 
C = {PI, P2, ... Pn}, we may associate a convex set of 
probabilities with it, its convex hull 
{ 
n n } 
C= �a;P; i�a;=l 
C and C may be considered for the same experiment 
with different interpretations. For example, let us con­
sider that we have two urns, ul and u2. ul has 99 
red balls and one black. U2 has one red ball and 99 
black ones. If we pick up a ball randomly from one of 
the two urns then, we have two possible probabilities, 
C = { P1, P2 }, for the color of the ball, one for each 
urn. However, if the experiment is to select an urn 
and then pick a ball, the frequencies of the colors will 
be given by one probability aP1 + (1- a)P2, where 
Cl' is the probability of selecting ul , and (1- a) the 
probability of selecting U2. As a is unknown, we have 
a convex set of probabilities C. We will always consider 
the second interpretation. That is, that we have a pre­
vious experiment consisting in randomly selecting one 
of the possible probability distributions. Therefore a 
set of probability distributions will be equivalent. t.o its 
convex hull. 
Above assumption may have some problems . For ex­
ample, assume that we have two variables, X 1 and X2 , 
which are known to be independent. For the first vari­
able we have the convex set of possible probabilities 
C1 = {P1, Q1}, and for the second variable, the convex 
set C2 = {P2, Q2}· Given these conditions, the possi­
ble set of probabilities for the variable X= (X1,X2) 
IS 
However, this set Cis not nccccsarily convex. \Ve may 
have: 
• Sometimes the convex combination 
is not equal to a product such as 
that is, an element from C. 
This has been considered also by B. Tessem (1989), in 
a slightly different problem: The induced set of prob­
abilities in X 2 , from a con vex set of 'a priori' distri­
butions on X, and a convex set of conditionals. It is 
shown that this set is not necessarily convex. 
We shall always represent uncertainty as a convex set. 
of probabilities. Then, in situations like this, we shall 
do an approximation of the possible set of probabili­
ties calculating its convex hull. From a practical point 
of view, this approximation is equivalent to assuming 
that the selection of probabilities for X 1 and X 2 may 
be done in a dependent way. That is, with probabil­
ity a we may choose P1 for X1 and P2 for X2 ; and 
with probability 1 - a it is possible to choose Q1 for 
X1 and Q2 for X2 . This does not imply that the 
variables X1 and X2 are dependent. In fact, the in­
dividual probabilities are combined by multiplication 
(P1.P2 and QJ.Q2). Only the probability distributions 
are selected on a dependent way. In a particular case, 
it may occurs that the selection of probabilities is in­
dependent. But then, we are adding some extra prob­
abilities. From this point of view, we are losing some 
information, but we lose it for the sake of simplicity. 
Convex sets are more manageabl"' than general sets. 
The combination of 'a priori' convex sets of prob­
ability distributions has been considered in Campos, 
Lamata, Moral (1988). If we have two 'a priori' con­
vex sets of probabilities cl and c:J given for t.he same 
set of conditions, then the conjunction will be the in­
tersection of the convex hulls, cl IIC2. The disjunction 
will be the convex hull of t.he union: cl u c2. 
This kind of combination is the one applied in situa­
tions like the following: We know that if we pick up a 
ball from this urn the probability of being red is be­
tween 0.75 and 0.85, and from other source we obtain 
that this probability is between 0.8 and 0.9. Then we 
may apply this combination (conjunction in this case) 
and deduce that the probability is between 0.8 and 
0.85. 
If C1 and C2 are convex sets of probabilities, but rel­
ative to different contexts Co1 and Co2, then no 'a 
priori' information may be deduced in the context 
Co1 U Co2 (both conditions are verified), except if one 
of the probabilities is degenerated. The following sit­
uation is perfectly possible: 
• C1 ={pi} in conditions Co1, where 
• C2 = {p2} in conditions Co2, where 
• C3 = {p3} in conditions Co1 u Co2, where 
However, if we have the following information, 
• Il: "Most of Computer Science students (CS) 
are single (S)" 
• 12: "Most of young people (Y) are single (S)" 
Where I1 and 12 may be translated in the probabilistic 
information, 
• Under conditions Co1 == { CS} 
P1(S) == 0.99 Pl(-,5) == 0.01 
• Under conditions Co2== {Y} 
Pz(S) == 0.99 pz( •S) == 0.01 
and nothing is known about the probability of being 
single UtHler conditions {CS,Y}, then common sense 
says that in this case it would not be wrong to assume 
that "Most young people stu ding Computer Science 
are single". It migth occur that young Computer Sci­
ence students are a rare combination and most of them 
are married. But if nothing is said about this, then it 
may be considered that there are not strange interac­
tions and that under conditions Co1 and Co2 we may 
use c3 == cl n c2 == {pi} == {pz}. 
In short, to do the combination of 'a priori' proba­
bilitic convex sets is neccesary to determine whether 
they are given in the same context. In shuch a case, 
we calculate the conjunction by the intersection of con­
vex sets and the disjunction by the convex hull of the 
union. If the sets of probabilities are given under two 
different contexts, then nothing can be said about the 
combination. However, when there is no more avail­
able information, then the former combination could 
be considered by default, but taking into account that 
this is an additional assumption we make about the 
problem. 
Very often, 'a priori' information is given by means 
of probability intervals or probability envelopes. A 
probability envelope is a pair of applications 
I, u : P(U) _____. [0, 1] 
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such that there exist a family P of probability mea­
sures verifying 
I( A)== inf P(A) u(A) ==sup P(A) 
pEP pEP 
It is clear that given a set of probabilities, C1, we may 
associate with it a probability envelope. However a 
probability envelope (I, u) may be defined from differ­
ent sets of probabilities. But, in every case, there is 
always a ma.ximal family given by 
P == {Pii(A) � P(A) � u(A),VA <;:; U} 
If C is a set of probabilities and we calculate the asso­
ciated envelope (I, u), this envelope is equivalent to a 
maximal family P. Always, we have C <;:; P. Then, if 
we transform a set C on an envelope we may consider 
that some information is lost (there are more proba­
bilities being possible). 
3 EVIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
3.1 LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS 
Assume that we do not have an 'a priori' information 
about X, but we have observed 0, and we have a family 
of conditional probabilities, 
P(OIX ==a;), a; E U. 
Taking into account that nothing is known about 'a 
priori' probabilities of a; are not known then nothing 
can be said about 'a posteriori' probabilities of a; after 
observing 0, with the exception that if P(Oia;) == 0 
then we can conclude that a; is impossible. Cosider 
the following example: We have U == {a1, a2} and 
P(O\aJ) == 1, P(O!a2) == 0.001 
Then after observing 0, we may have p(a2IO) == 1 
(p(a2IO) == 0) if the unknown 'a priori' probability 
was p(a2) == 1 (p(az) == 0). However, it is clear that 
after observing 0, a2 should be considered less possible 
than a1. In conclussion the information provided by 
0 can not be represented by probabilities or interval 
probabilities. We shall do as in Clasical Non-Bayesian 
Statistics and say that 0 defines a likelihood function, 
10, on U, which is a mapping from U on the interval 
[0, 1], given by 
lo(a;) == P(OIX ==a;), a; E U. 
This likelihood may be interpreted as a possibility 
distribution, 11'0, which is not neccesarily normalized 
(Smets 1982). 
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The possibility measure associated with 1r 0 is defined 
(Zadeh 1978) as a mapping 
given by 
ITo : P( U) ___, [0, 1] 
ITo( A)= max 7r0(a) 
aEA 
The following proposition relates a possibility measure 
with probability bounds. 
Proposition.- Given a possibility measure ITo on U, 
then 
ITo(A) 2: P(O n A) 
and these bounds are optimal under information 0. 
Proof.-
P(OnA)= L P(On{ai})= 
a,EA 
L P(Oia;).p(a;) = L 'lro(a;).p(a;) 
Now, taking into account that, 
L p(a;) = P(A)::; 1 ,  
aiEA 
we get the required inequality, 
P(O n A) ::0 max 7r0(a;) =ITo( A). 
a,EA 
The bounds are optimal in the sense that being 
then, if 
we may consider the 'a priori' probability 
- p(a;) = 0, othenvise 
With this 'a priori' probability, 
P(O n A)= p(ak)P(Oiak) = ITo(A), 
that is, equality is given. • 
These bounds are not associated with conditional 
probabilities, P(.IO), but with probabilities of consis­
tency with information 0. To consider real conditional 
probabilities we have to divide by P(O), but this prob­
ability is unknown, and we only have an upper bound 
IT0(U). The normalization by this value may be con­
sidered as an upper relative degree of consistency, 
, (A) = ITo(A) go ITo(U) 
From this upper value, we may define the lower limit 
as 
go,(A) = 1- go'(A). 
3.2 CONVEX SETS OF LIKELIHOOD 
FUNCTIONS 
On the other hand, it is possible that the exact val­
ues of conditional probabilities are not known. For 
example, we only have probability intervals 
b; ::; P(OIX =a;) ::; c; 
In this case, observation 0 does not define only one 
likelihood function, but a convex set of likelihoods, 
those verifying a; ::=; l( a;) ::=; c; . This convex set will 
be called the evidential information associated with 0 
and denote it by E0• 
An evidential information also has an associated pos­
sibility distribution, 
7r0(a;) = max l(a;) 
lEE. 
This possibility distribution also verifies a similar pro­
position to the above, relative to probability bounds. 
In the same way, we may associate the pair of lower­
upper measures (go, go'). 
With the same reasoning as in 'a priori' information, it 
will be considered that a set of likelihood functions, E, 
is equivalent to its convex hull, E. A special likelihood 
function is the null likelihood, IN , defined as 
This likelihood function comes from an observation, 
0, for which 
P(Oia;) = 0 
are possible conditional probabilities (there may be an­
other possible conditional probabilities defining other 
likelihood functions associated with observation 0). 
It is clear that after observing 0, these conditional 
probabilities are impossible, because we have 
P(O) = l:P(Oia;)p(a;) = 0 
Then IN has to be considered as an impossible like­
lihood. It could be thought that when IN appears it 
would be better to remove it. In fact, the removing 
of something impossible must not change our state of 
mind. But for the same reason the inclussion of IN 
should not have any effect in our final results. This 
will happen in our model: never the final probability 
intervals will chage because of the inclussion or elimi­
nation of IN. 
Taking the above reasons into account we shall extend 
our original equivalence relation among sets of likeli­
hood functions, considering that two sets, E1 and E2, 
are equivalent if and only if E1 U {IN} = E2 U {IN}. 
That is, if previously including the null linkelihood 
their convex hulls are equal. The effect of this equiv­
alence relation will be that if we have a likelihood, I, 
we do not have to consider any likelihood ex .I (where 
ex ::; 1). This is not strange. Having I, the likelihood 
ad (ex::; 1) defines the same relative possibilities, but 
with a lower norma.lization factor. 
In the following, the convex set E U {IN} will be de­
noted as C( E). 
The disjunction and conjunction of evidential informa­
tion are defined in an analogous way to the disjunction 
and conjunction of 'a priori' information. 
If E1 and E2 are two sets of evidential information, the 
disjunction, E1 V E2 , is defined as C(E1 U E2). The 
conjunction, E1 1\ E2 , is defined as the intersection of 
the couvex hulls: C(E1) II C(Ez). 
Here is important to distinguish between the conjunc­
tion of evidential information, C(E1) II C(E2) and the 
evidential observation associated with the conjunc­
tion of two observations 01 and 02, Eo,AO,· The 
first is applied when we know that E1 and E2 are 
two convex sets of likelihood functions associated with 
the same observation and is performed calculating 
C(E1) n C(E2). The last, when we have two sets of 
likelihoods corresponding to two observations, 01 and 
02, and we want to calculate the evidential informa­
tion associated with 01 1\ 02. The same is applied for 
the disjunction. 
For the calculus of evidential information Eo, AO, from 
the evidential information Eo, and Eo,, we have to 
calculate the possible values for the probability P( 01/\ 
Ozlai) from the values of P(01Ia;) and P(02Ia;). The 
only thing we can say is that 
max {0, P(01Ia;) + P(02Ia;)- 1}::; P(01 /\ 02la;)::; 
::; min {P(01Iai), P(02Ia;)} 
then we have to consider in Eo, 1\0, all the likelihood 
functions, I, verifying 
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where 11 E Eo,,l2 E Eo,. 
For the associated possibility distribution, we get 
Jro,Ao,(a;) =min {1ro, (a;), Jro,(a;)} 
that is, the same formula as in classical Possibility 
Theory (Dubois, Prade 1988), but without assuming 
any additional assumption of coherence or compatibil­
ity of observations. 
If we assume that 01 and 02 are conditionally inde­
pendent given the value of X then we get: 
Jro,Ao,(a;) = Jro,(a;).Jro,(a;). 
Another assumptions may be make to obtain different 
combination formulas for operations on observations. 
4 COMBINATION OF 'A PRIORI' 
AND EVIDENTIAL INFORMA­
TION 
Here, it is considered the combination of a con vex set 
of 'a priori' probabilities, C, with an evidential infor­
mation, E. The method is a generalization of Bayes 
Theorem and is based on the formula of conditioning 
in Moral, Campos ( 1990). The generalization given 
here is different from the one given by Smets (1978, 
1981). The main difference comes from the fact that 
we assume that an observation defines a consonant ev­
idence (a possibility) and Smets works with general 
evidential information. Also, in our approach, we dis­
tinguish between evidential and 'a priori' information 
using different methods according to the particular sit­
uation. 
The combination of a probability measure p about the 
values of X and a possibility associated with obser­
vation 0 7r0(a;) = p(OIX = a;), is given by the 
function, 
h(a;) = p(a;).7r0(a;). 
We shall denote this function h by p x 1!'0• After 
normalization, h determines the values of conditional 
probability, 
The normalization factor may be considered as the 
likelihood of the 'a priori' probability given 0. A very 
small likelihood of h may make us suspect the initial 
values of probability and therefore, the resulting con­
ditional probabilities. Furthermore, in this case these 
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values will be very sensitive to the lack of accuracy of 
initial probabilities. 
The above expression is precisely Bayes formula, de­
veloped in two stages: first combination and after nor­
malization. In a similar way, we shall define the com­
bination of an 'a priori' convex set of probability dis­
tributions and an evidential information Eo as the set, 
H = C({p x 1rJp E C, 1r E Eo})= C0Eo 
As before, and by analogous reasons we shall assume 
that two combination sets, Hi and H2, are equivalent 
if C(Hi) = C(H2). 
To assign probability intervals (Moral, Campos 1990) 
to the set H we select the extreme points of H, 
hi, ... , hn. Each hk different from the null function 
can define a probability value, normalizing it by its 
likelihood, 
We could now calculate the upper and lower probabil­
ity values by means of the expression, 
to *(AID)= max Pk(AIO), k 
to.(AJO) = min Pk(AJO) k 
This is equivalent to upper-lower conditioning (Demp­
ster 1967; Fagin, Halpern 1990). But in this method 
there is some missing information. In effect, given that 
hk is the true combination, then in this case, the prob­
ability of observation 0 is Lj hk(aj ). According to our 
definition of possibility, this defines a possibility about 
the combination functions and the corresponding con­
ditional probabilities, given by 
7r(Pk(.JO)) = I>k(Xj) 
j 
That is, we do not only have a set of conditional prob­
abilities, we also have a possibility about them. This 
possibility also defines upper and lower probabilities: 
If D <;::: {pi(.JO), ... ,pm(.JO)}, then 
*(D)
_ II(D) 
90 - maxk 7r(Pk(.JO)) ' 
Now, we define the upper and lower conditional inter­
vals in the following way. The upper and lower values 
of B given observation 0, are calculated by means of 
Choquet integral (Choquet 1953) of conditional prob­
abilities with respect to the measures g� and 9o., re­
spectively: 
P;(B) = I(Pk(BIO)/g/), 
Po.(B) = I(Pk(BJO)/go.), 
these integrals being defined in the following way, 
l(hjg) = fooo g(Ha)da 
where 
- h is a function h : U --+ Rt 
- Ha = {x E UJh(x) 2: a} 
- g is a monotone fuzzy measure (non necessarily 
additive (Sugeno 1974)). 
It is important to point out that the result of the com­
bination is the set H, not the intervals. For exam­
ple, we may have the same intervals coming from pure 
possibilistic information or a convex set of probability 
distributions. However, after combining each one of 
them with new information, the intervals may become 
very different. The following example illustrates these 
ideas. 
Example.- Let us consider a set U = { 1, 2, 3} and an 
obsevation Oi such that 
The intervals defined by this observation are 
0 --+ (0, OJ 
{2} --+ (0, 0.5] 
{1,2} __, [0.8, I] 
{2, 3} --+ [0, 0.5) 
{1} --+ (0.5, 1) 
{3} --+ (0, 0.2) 
{1,3}- [0.5,1) 
{1, 2, 3}- [1, 1) 
Now assume that we have a convex set of probability 
distributions, C, with extreme points 
1 2 3 
Pi 1 0 0 
P2 0.5 0.5 0 
P3 0.5 0.3 0.2 
P4 0.8 0 0.2 
The intervals associated with it are the same as before. 
However the information is different and it is combined 
in a different way. Assume now that we have observa­
tion 02 and 
p(02Jl) = 0.1, p(02l2) = 0.6, p(0213) = 1 
If we assume that 01 and 02 are conditionally inde­
pendent given the value of X, then the conjunction 
of these two observations gives rise to the following 
possibility and intervals. 
0 ---. [0, 0] 
{2}---. [0.33, 1] 
{1, 2}---. [0.33, 1] 
{2,3}---. [0.67, 1] 
{1}---. [0, 0.33] 
{3}---. [0,0.67] 
{ 1, 3} ---. [0, 0.67] 
{1,2,3}-+[1,1] 
If we combine observation 02 with the convex set C, 
we get the convex set H with extreme points 
1 2 3 
hi 0 0 0 
h2 0.1 0 0 
h3 0.05 0.3 0 
h4 0.05 0.18 0.2 
h5 0.08 0 0.2 
The corresponding normalized probabilities and possi­
bilities are 
1 2 3 71' 
undefined undefined undefined 0 
1 0 0 0.1 
0.14 0.86 0 0.35 
0.12 0.42 0.46 0.43 
0.29 0 0.71 0.28 
The intervals, calculated using Choquet integral are, 
0 ---. [0, 0] 
{2}- [0.15, 0.78] 
{1,2}---+ [0.37,0.91] 
{2, 3} ---+ [0.60, 0.88] 
{ 1} ---+ [0.12, 0.40] 
{3} ---+ [0.09, 0.63] 
{1, 3} ---+ [0.22, 0.85] 
{1, 2, 3}- [1, 1] 
which are really different to the corresponding to the 
combination of 01 and 02. 
The most important thing to remark in this combina­
tion method is that it is a mixture of Classical Statis­
tics based on likelihood functions and Bayesian Statis­
tics. When we have a probabilistic 'a priori' infor­
mation then Bayes Theorem is obtained. When we do 
not have 'a priori' information a likelihood function 
or its corresponding possibility is considered. When 
we have an 'a priori' information consisting on a con­
vex set of probabilities, then Bayes Theorem is applied 
to each individual probability but, at the same time, 
it is defined a likelihood about the possible probabili­
ties. Then we are using at the same time Bayes The­
orem and likelihood functions, the first is applied to 
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transform probabilities, the second to change our be­
lief about what is the true probability. The following 
example illustrates these ideas. 
Example.- Assume as above that we have two urns U1 
and U2 with red and black balls·. 
U1 99 1·ed 1 black 
U2 1 red 99 black 
Consider that we pick up two balls with replacement 
from the same urn and the events are denoted as fol­
lows: 
- B1 The first ball is black 
- R1 The first ball is red 
- B2 The second ball is black 
- R2 The second ball is red 
For the color of the two balls we have an 'a priori' in­





R1 n B2 
0.0099 
0.0099 
B1 n R2 
0.0099 
0.0099 
B1 n B2 
0.0001 
0.9801 
Assume now that we observe the colour of the first 
ball: red. This defines the following likelihood 
R1 n R2 R1 n B2 B 1 n R2 
1 1 0 
B1 n B2 
0 











B1 n B2 
0 
0 
If we normalize the probabilities calculating the corre­
sponding possibilities we get 
PJ(.JR1) 
P2(.JR1) 
R2 B2 71' 
0.99 0.01 0.99 
0.01 0.99 0.01 
Observe as we have transformed each probability dis­
tribution according to Bayes rule. But also, the com­
bination defines a possibility about which is the true 
probability (or what is equivalent: which is the true 
urn) . Note also that here the probabilities for the sec­
ond ball are the same as before the first ball is ob­
served. However, knowing that the first ball is red 
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defines a likelihood about which is the true urn, that 
changes our belief about the colour of the second ball. 
The integration of conditional probabilities and possi­
bilities by using Choquet integral produces the follow­
ing intervals: 
R2 [0.9801, 0.9900] 
B2 [0.0100, 0.0199] 
These intervals incorporate not only the changes on 
conditonal probabilities but also our chages on belief 
about the urns, that is, the bayesian updating and the 
likelihood information. 
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